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Abstract
In the context of the recent COVID-19 outbreak, quarantine has been used to ”flatten the
curve” and slow the spread of the disease.In this paper, we show that this is not the only benefit of
quarantine for the mitigation of an SIR epidemic spreading on a graph. Indeed, we theoretically
prove that nodes of high-degree are disproportionately in the Removed state after a first wave of
infection, which has very positive consequences. In particular, powerlaw graphs do not retain their
structure after a few waves of infection, which implies second and third waves may be of much
smaller amplitude than the first wave. We propose an opening and closing strategy aiming at
immunizing the graph while infecting the minimum number of individuals, while guaranteeing the
population is now robust to future infections. We experimentally verify our results on simulated
networks.
1 Introduction
Most real-life networks, from the technological (the Internet [14, 42], train routes [63], electronic
circuits [37]) to the biological (neural networks [73, 74], protein interaction networks [38]) exhibit a
powerlaw structure. Human networks are no exception (the film actors network [7, 73], the telephone-
call graph [3, 4], the sexual contact graph [45, 46]). Recent tracking studies have confirmed that the
network of proximity contact follows the same distribution [61, 39].
When it comes to epidemics, this has terrible consequences. In particular, this means that the
epidemic threshold is vanishing [57], which implies that measures to reduce the probability of infection
(hand-washing, social distancing, etc.) can slow the spread of the disease, but not stop the outbreak.
It also implies that an outbreak is likely to start anew even from a single infected individual (e.g. a
traveler). Only measures that break the structure of the graph (such as quarantine, closing restaurants
and parks, prohibiting groups of more than 10 etc.) can stop the spread. Moreover, powerlaw graphs
are incredibly resistant to random failures [6], which means that removing individuals at random (for
instance if they received a vaccine, or if they caught the disease and developed immunity) will not
change these properties. As most countries affected by COVID-19 are relaxing quarantine while many
infected individuals remain infected, one might think that the second wave will be identical to the
first wave.
However, if powerlaw graphs are resistant to random failure, they are very susceptible to targeted
immunization [6]. As shown in the previously mentioned paper, vaccinating only a small percentage
of the nodes of the graph (the nodes of highest degree) is enough to achieve herd immunity, while it is
never achievable with random immunization. The key observation here is that epidemic spread is not
equivalent to random immunization. In particular, nodes of high degree get infected much faster than
nodes of low degree [57]. If we let the epidemic run its course, this superspreader phenomenon would
just help the epidemic spread rapidly to all the nodes in the network. However, if the epidemic is
temporarily halted, say because of a mandatory quarantine, in the SIR model this implies that nodes
of high degree will become immunized without having had the possibility of spreading the infection.
Multiple quarantines can then become an ersatz to achieving herd immunity (or at least slow its
spread and ”flatten the curve”) before a vaccine is developed.
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1.1 Relevant work
The study of epidemics on graphs is an active field of research. An important body of work assumes
the underlying graph is known, and focuses on modeling epidemics [19, 75, 32, 16, 78, 47], detecting
whether there is an epidemic [8, 9, 54, 53, 51, 44, 40], finding communities [60, 76], localizing the
source of the spread [65, 66, 64, 69, 72, 70, 20] or instead obfuscating it [26, 28, 27], or controlling
their spread [43, 21, 22, 34, 29, 71, 77, 58]. The inverse problem, recovering the network from epidemic
data, has also been extensively studied [56, 1, 18, 59, 41, 35, 33].
This paper is interested in immunization strategies. [6] already showed that immunizing about 3%
of the nodes of highest degree is enough to reach herd immunity for any powerlaw graph, no matter
the exponent. [17] proposed a local strategy in case the global structure of the graph is unknown:
we pick a fraction ρ of the population; each of those individuals then names someone they personally
know. It turns out that the person selected has a higher chance of being well-connected than the
person who nominated them, following the well-known principle stating that ”your friends have more
friends than you.” This paper relies on a similar idea: someone infecting someone else is similar to
someone nominating someone else, which explains why nodes of highest degree get infected faster.
Other immunization strategies have been proposed [36, 15, 62, 12].
Many scientists have joined the fight against COVID-19, and work has been done to predict the
evolution of the epidemic [31, 23, 11, 67], predict diagnostics [2, 68], analyze the spread of misinfor-
mation about the pandemic online [5, 55], design tracking algorithms and technologies [49, 10, 13],
analyze testing and interventions policies [48, 24, 25, 50], and more. One other work [30] has ana-
lyzed quarantine strategies, albeit without taking into consideration the impact on the graph, which
is our main contribution. This work aims to analyze quarantines and emphasize their impact as a
targeted immunization strategy, which would be robust to future reinfections (contrary to contact
tracing strategies, for instance).
1.2 Main contributions
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• While quarantines have been introduced to slow the spread of COVID-19, we show that they
transform the structure of the human contact graph, and negatively impact the diffusion of the
disease during the subsequent waves.
• We characterize when to declare the quarantine in order to achieve herd immunity. For powerlaw
graph of exponent 3 in the configuration model, this corresponds to when about 8% of the graph
is infected.
• We experimentally show that it is possible to minimize the expected number of removed indi-
viduals at the end of the process. While about 100% of the nodes contract the disease with
commonly accepted COVID-19 parameters, about 65% of the population will have contracted
the disease with a well-timed quarantine.
• While the number above is higher than what we would hope, it is important to note that after
this single quarantine, outbreaks cannot start again from a constant number of individuals. As
such, this is the first long-term immunization solution which is robust to reinfections but does
not require a vaccine.
• If we have some limitations on the maximum number of infected individuals (e.g. a limited
number of hospital beds), we experimentally show that we can declare multiple quarantines and
recover the result from a single quarantine.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
The epidemic spreads on a (possibly infinite) directed graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes
and E the set of edges. If |V | < ∞, we write |V | = N . When considering a random graph drawn
from a specific distribution D, we denote by Pk the random variable representing the number of nodes
of degree k in the graph, pk the fraction of nodes of degree k, and qk the fraction of nodes of excess
degree k, defined by qk =
(k+1)pk
<k> . As a shorthand, we write E{Rk}∞k=0 [k] =
∞∑
k=0
Rk · k. If no sequence
{Rk}∞k=0 is specified, we assume Rk = Pk, and E[k] and E[k2] represent the average degree and degree
squared of the graph.
2.2 Model
SIR model on graphs: We consider the spread of a Susceptible → Infected → Removed (SIR)
epidemic on a directed graph G = (V,E), possibly infinite. Each node belongs to one of these three
states. Infected nodes can infect the susceptible nodes with which they share an edge, also called their
neighbors in the graph. Each infection along an edge is independent of other infections. Infected
nodes spontaneously transition to the Removed state after a non-deterministic time. Once in the
Removed state, nodes do not interact with the epidemic anymore.
Spreading model: The results presented in this paper are spreading-mechanism agnostic. Our
theoretical results do not rely on restrictions on the spreading process. While our experiments are
shown on classical continuous-time SIR spread, we do not believe the spreading process would change
the outcome.
Configuration model: Our theoretical results are established in the configuration model [57]. In
this model, we specify the number of nodes Pk of degree k. We assume the sum of all Pk is even. We
then assign stubs to nodes, such that the number of nodes with k stubs is exactly Pk. Following this,
we pick two stubs at random, and connect them. We repeat the process until no stubs are left. We
say the resulting graph was drawn from the configuration model with degrees sequence {Pk}∞k=0.
Powerlaw graphs: We emphasize the results on powerlaw graphs. A powerlaw gaph of exponent α
is a random graph with degree distribution following the law Pk ∼ Ckα .
2.3 Known results in the configuration model
We recall known results in the configuration model, which we use in the rest of the paper.
Claim 1 (Exponential growth, proved in [57]). In the configuration model, c2c1 , the number of 2
nd
neighbors divided by the number of 1st neighbors, can be computed from the sequence of degrees
{Pk}Nk=0. Its value is:
E[k2]− E[k]
E[k]
.
Claim 2 (Herd immunity, proved in [57]). In the configuration model, an outbreak is possible if and
only if c2c1 > 1, or equivalently:
E[k2]− 2E[k] > 0.
Equivalently, if the above equation is not satisfied, we have achieved herd immunity.
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Lemma 1 (Disparity in infection rate by degree, proved in [57]). In the configuration model, let u(t)
be the expected fraction of nodes of degree 1 in the susceptible state after time t. Then the expected
fraction of nodes of degree k in the susceptible state is u(t)k.
2.4 Known results for powerlaw graphs
We first start by defining what the epidemic threshold is:
Definition 1 (Epidemic threshold, proved in [57]). For SIR epidemics on graph, there exists a phase
transition. If the parameters of the epidemic are above the epidemic threshold, outbreaks occur; oth-
erwise, the epidemic dies out quickly. The closer we are to the epidemic threshold (from above), the
smaller the outbreak is.
The epidemic threshold for powerlaw graphs is 0.
Lemma 2 (Vanishing threshold, Proved in [57]). Infinite powerlaw graphs with exponents between 2
and 3.4788 have a vanishing epidemic threshold.
In particular, this means that changing the parameters of the spread (for instance by enforcing
hand-washing or masks-wearing) can slow the spread of the disease but not interrupt an outbreak.
In practice, real graphs are finite, which implies the epidemic threshold is bounded away from 0.
However, the larger the graph, the lower the epidemic threshold.
3 One quarantine
In this section, we study the effect of one quarantine on the structure of the graph. We are particularly
interested in whether it is possible to achieve herd immunity, and how to minimize the total number
of people who have been touched by the epidemic. For the remainder of the paper, we study perfect
quarantines, as defined below:
Definition 2 (Quarantine). We call quarantine the complete halt of the spread of the epidemic.
During a quarantine, all infected nodes transition to the removed state, and no new nodes become
infected.
3.1 The quarantine operator
Lemma 3. Let u(t) be the fraction of nodes of degree 1 that are susceptible after letting the epidemic
spread for time t. Suppose we declare a quarantine when u(t) reaches the value u. Let TQ : NN → RN
be the operator representing the transformation of the expected number of susceptible nodes after one
iteration of letting the epidemic grow, then declaring a quarantine. Then:
TQ({Pk}N−1k=0 ) = {Pk · uk}N−1k=0 .
Proof. This is a direct implication of Lemma 1 from the Preliminaries.
As it turns out, the number of nodes in the removed state can be computed easily from the above
result.
Claim 3. Let g0(z) be the generative function of the distribution of degrees. The expected fraction of
nodes in the removed state after one quarantine RQ is:
RQ = 1− g0(u).
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Proof. Let pk be the fraction of nodes of degrees k in the graph, so that Pk = N · pk. Notice that for
k ≥ N , there exist no nodes of that degree, so pk = 0. The generative function of the distribution of
degrees is g0(z) =
∞∑
j=0
pjz
j .
RQ =
1
N
N − N∑
j=0
TQ({Pk}Nk=0)j

=
1
N
N − N∑
j=0
Pj · uj

= 1−
∞∑
j=0
pj · uj
= 1− g0(u).
3.2 Achieving herd immunity
3.2.1 General graphs
We first establish results for general graphs:
Claim 4. Let u be the remaining fraction of susceptible nodes of degree 1 when we start the quarantine.
We achieve herd immunity for u such that:
u2g′′0 (u)− ug′0(u) ≤ 0.
Proof. Following Claim 2, we want to find u such that ETQ [k2]− 2ETQ [k] ≤ 0. This translates to:
ETQ [k2]− 2ETQ [k] =
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk2 − 2
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk
=
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk2 −
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk −
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk
=
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk(k − 1)−
∞∑
k=0
Pk · ukk
= u2g′′0 (u)− ug′0(u)
≤ 0.
3.2.2 Powerlaw graphs
We give some numerical results for powerlaw graphs:
Claim 5. Let u be the remaining fraction of susceptible nodes of degree 1 when we start the quarantine.
For an infinite powerlaw graph of exponent 3, we achieve herd immunity for u ≤ 0.940599.
Proof. We want to find u such that:
ETQ [k2]− 2ETQ [k] =
∞∑
k=1
C
k3
· ukk2 − 2
∞∑
k=1
C
k3
· ukk
= C
∞∑
k=1
uk
k
− 2u
k
k2
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= −C · (2Li2(u)− log(1− u))
≤ 0.
Where Li2(u) is the polylog-2 function. Solving this equation numerically yields u ≤ 0.940599.
We now look at the total number of nodes in the removed state in this case:
Claim 6. If we declare a quarantine when a fraction u′ = 0.940599 of nodes of degree 1 are still in
the susceptible state, then by the end of quarantine, at least RQ = 92.2912% of the nodes are still in
the susceptible state.
Proof. Remembering that C = 1ζ(3) , where ζ(x) =
∑∞
k=1
1
kx , the number of susceptible nodes is:
g0(u
′) ≥ 1
ζ(3)
N∑
k=1
u′k
k3
≈ 0.922912.
Combining Claims 5 and 6, the network can therefore achieve herd immunity while infecting a bit
less than 8% of the nodes:
Theorem 1. For powerlaw graphs of exponent 3, min-degree 1, it is possible to achieve herd immunity
by declaring a single quarantine when a bit less than 6% of the nodes of degree 1 are infected. In this
case, less than 8% of the nodes will be removed at the end of the quarantine.
Remarks:
• Quarantines can have extremely positive side effects, including achieving herd immunity.
• When herd immunity is achieved, there exists an epidemic threshold, and measures to slow the
spread (e.g. washing hands) become impactful.
• The result above is both positive (only 8% of removed nodes) and disappointing: this is the
best achievable, in the sense that nothing else we can do in this optimistic quarantine model
can reduce the fraction of removed nodes at the end. In most cases, 8% of the population being
infected represents millions of people, and is not desirable.
• Having reached herd immunity does not mean that the disease dies out, but rather that only
a fraction of the graph will be infected. What we might desire instead is to minimize the total
number of removed nodes at the end, if the epidemic started again after the quarantine.
We study this last point experimentally in section 4.
4 Experiments
In this section, we validate the theoretical results described above by simulating the course of an
SIR epidemic with perfect quarantines on randomly generated and real networks. Simulations were
run using a continuous-time event-driven algorithm [52]. An infection is initialized by uniformly
randomly selecting ρ nodes to be infected. We simulate perfect quarantines by moving all nodes in
the I compartment to the R compartment and uniformly randomly selecting ρ susceptible nodes to
become infected after quarantine. All simulations are run until there are no more infected nodes.
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4.1 Single Quarantine on Baraba´si-Albert Graphs
The first series of experiments focuses on the well-studied Baraba´si-Albert (BA) class of random
graphs. BA graphs are scale-free, with a degree distribution that falls off according to the cubic
powerlaw: P (k) ∼ k−3. For this first set of experiments, we consider a BA graph with 10K nodes,
with parameter m = 5. We will initially consider an infection with spreading and recovery rates equal,
both set to 0.1, and we set the number of infected nodes post-quarantine, ρ, to be 10. We find that the
results we will present are fairly insensitive to the choice of graph parameters or infection parameters.
We consider the effect of performing a single quarantine, which is triggered once a fixed proportion
of the population is either infected or recovered, a quantity which we denote the quarantine threshold.
We consider quarantine thresholds ranging from 0 to 1, with increments of 0.01, and run 100 trials
for each fixed threshold.
(a) Infected nodes by time on a BA graph with a
single quarantine.
(b) Recovered nodes by time on a BA graph with
a single quarantine.
Figure 1: Simulations run on a BA graph with 100K nodes. The blue curve indicates no quarantine,
the red curve demonstrates the single-quarantine strategy that minimizes the final number of recovered
nodes, and the green curve demonstrates the single-quarantine strategy that minimizes the maximum
number of infected nodes.
The two criteria we will examine are the final number of recovered nodes and the maximum
number of infected nodes. The final number of recovered nodes indicates how many nodes will have
become infected throughout the course of the epidemic. The maximum number of infected nodes was
shown to be an important quantity of interest during the COVID-19 pandemic, as hospitals operating
above their capacity were forced to make tragic choices between patients in need of treatment. Figure 1
demonstrates the single-quarantine strategies that minimize either of these two criteria. Qualitatively,
the minimum of the maximum number of infected nodes will be attained by enacting a quarantine
that roughly balances the number of infected nodes at quarantine-time with the peak that is attained
after quarantine. However, to minimize the final number of recovered nodes, a quarantine should be
enacted just before the epidemic peaks, to effectively neutralize the second wave of the infection. Here
we notice that the optimal single-quarantine strategy differs depending on which criterion we seek
to minimize. We examine this further in figure 2(a) where we plot these two quantities versus the
quarantine threshold. We observe that each of these quantities exhibits a V-like curve, however their
minima are attained at different quarantine thresholds.
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(a) Maximum number of infected individuals and fi-
nal number of recovered individuals plotted versus
quarantine threshold. Notice that the y-axes dif-
fer. There is a clear optimal quarantine threshold
depending on the objective, however these optima
do not align.
(b) Final number of recovered nodes when quar-
antines are enacted near the optimal quaran-
tine threshold. Observe that as the quarantine
threshold approaches the optimum, the num-
ber of outbreaks decreases, as does the extent
of each outbreak.
Figure 2: Examining single-quarantine strategies
As alluded to by our theory, a perfect quarantine serves as an organic form of targeted immunization
and favors the removal of high-degree nodes, yielding a graph in the configuration model with a lighter-
tailed degree distribution. We conjecture that this has a twofold effect in reducing the final number
of infected nodes. Primarily, the graph structure is broken up enough to reduce the number of nodes
that become infected in the event that an outbreak does occur; and secondarily, the probability of
an outbreak occurring decreases after a reinitialization of the infection post-quarantine. This effect
is demonstrated in figure 2(b) where we plot a histogram of the final number of recovered nodes on
multiple simulations for multiple runs with a fixed quarantine threshold. The bimodal distribution
indicates that many reinitializations peter out quickly and outbreaks do not occur. However, some
outbreaks do occur, but yield smaller numbers of final-recovered nodes than a no-quarantine scenario.
When the quarantine is declared at the optimal moment, there is no significant new outbreak after
the quarantine is over, as can be seen by the flat red curve in Figure 1(b). This is despite infecting
a fraction ρ of the population: with this simple quarantine, the new network is now robust to future
outbreaks. Quarantining therefore constitutes a valid immunization strategy.
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4.2 Two Quarantines on Baraba´si-Albert Graphs
(a) Infected nodes by time on a BA graph with
two quarantines.
(b) Recovered nodes by time on a BA graph with
two quarantines.
Figure 3: Simulations run on a BA graph with 100K nodes. The blue curve indicates no quarantine, the
red curve demonstrates the double-quarantine strategy that minimizes the final number of recovered
nodes, and the green curve demonstrates the double-quarantine strategy that minimizes the maximum
number of infected nodes.
Now we consider the effect of running two quarantines on a BA graph. The graph settings as well
as the epidemic parameters and reinitialization model are kept the same from the single-quarantine
section. We enact two perfect quarantines at thresholds Q1, Q2, where the first quarantine is enacted
when Q1 fraction of the population is either infected or recovered, and the second quarantine is enacted
when Q2 proportion of the total population has entered either the infected or recovered compartments
after the first quarantine. We perform a grid search over values of Q1, Q2 and report the maximum
number of infected nodes as well as the final number of recovered nodes in Figure 4. The number
of infected and recovered nodes for the quarantine settings that attain optimal criteria are plotted
against the no-quarantine scenario in Figure 3.
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(a) Final recovered nodes with two quarantines.
Darker means fewer nodes were infected.
(b) Maximum number of infected nodes with two
quarantines. Lighter colors correspond to smaller
peaks.
Figure 4: Heatmaps displaying the final recovered nodes and maximum infected nodes under various
two-quarantine strategies. Observe that two quarantines cannot achieve a noticeably lower number of
final recovered nodes, and the optimum is attained when the sum of Q1 and Q2 is equivalent to the
optimal quarantine threshold in the single-quarantine setting. The maximum number of infected nodes
is displayed on the right: notice that the optimal two-quarantine strategy here has both quarantines
occur earlier than the optimal strategy for minimizing R.
Examining the heatmap in Figure 4(a) that displays the final number of recovered nodes in a
two-quarantine setting, we observe the following qualitative trends. The dark-colored bands indicate
quarantine strategies that have low numbers of final recovered nodes, which are most prevalent along
a horizontal line and a diagonal line, i.e. the set of gridpoints such that Q1 +Q2 is fixed at 0.64, which
is the optimal value for the single quarantine setting. This indicates that there is not much benefit to
enacting a second quarantine, if the first quarantine was enacted at the correct time.
The heatmap in Figure 4(b) displays the maximum number of infected nodes. The lighter patches
indicate lower maximum numbers of infected nodes, and can qualitatively be characterized as a tri-
angular patch bordered on the bottom by a horizontal band. The horizontal banding is indicative of
the first peak dominating, whereas the light triangular patch represents the regime where the quaran-
tines are enacted to roughly balance the height of all three peaks. One should also observe that both
the minimal horizontal band and the minimal triangular patch in the right heatmap are higher and
shifted to the left from the minimal bands in the left heatmap. This supports the trend observed in
the single quarantine setting that quarantines should be enacted earlier to minimize maximal number
of individuals infected at any one point, whereas quarantines should be enacted later to minimize the
total number of infected individuals.
4.3 Multiple quarantines
As discussed before, minimizing the maximum number of infected nodes or the total number of
removed nodes happens for different quarantine thresholds. In this section, we want to achieve the
best of both worlds: minimizing the total number of removed nodes while never letting the maximum
number of infected nodes rise above a certain threshold.
This is achieved in a slightly different setting than before. Instead of declaring a quarantine when
a certain threshold is reached, we declare it when a certain value of infected nodes is reached. The
results are below:
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Figure 5: Final fraction of recovered nodes with as many quarantines as needed, as a function of the
number of infected nodes when we declare the quarantine.
Our first observation is that there exist some quarantine strategies which allow for about 65% of
removed nodes, which is the optimal final number of removed nodes in the case of a single quarantine.
We also notice that many of these strategies exist, which would allow for an adapted strategy depending
on the size of the city in which it’s deployed. Finally, although some strategies perform much worse
than others, they all are an improvement compared to never deploying a quarantine.
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